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In light of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' recent 
appointment of the Accounting Objectives Study Group to formulate the 
objectives of financial statements, some questions were raised regarding the 
propriety of regulating accounting information through specifying the objec-
tives of financial statements. Arguments were put forth stating that, in view 
of the generally demonstrated efficiency of the marketplace, Adam Smith's 
invisible hand will cause the appropriate kind and quantity of accounting 
information to be communicated; and that therefore the regulation of account-
ing information by a group of interested preparers and users will be wasteful. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether—in view of the theory of, 
and the empirical findings related to, efficient markets—there is a justification 
for the specification of accounting objectives. 
The first part of this paper discusses the implications of the efficient 
market hypothesis and its related research with respect to the choice of a 
"best" accounting system. The second part is addressed to the question of 
whether there exist market incentives for firms to produce an optimal amount 
of accounting information which would eliminate the need for regulation. The 
issue is examined first by assuming that no disclosure laws exist, and then 
the existing disclosure laws are explicitly taken into consideration. 
The Implications of Efficient Market Research 
On the Choice Among Accounting Alternatives 
Recent research effort in accounting1 centers on the implications of the 
efficient market hypothesis and the empirical capital market research for 
1 Ray Ball and Philip Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Num-
bers," Journal of Accounting Research (Autumn 1968), pp. 159-178. W. Beaver, P. 
Kettler, and M. Scholes, "The Association Between Accounting Information and 
Market Valuation of Securit ies," Accounting Review (October 1970), pp. 654-682. 
Will iam H. Beaver, "The Behavior of Security Prices and Its Implications for Account ing 
Research (Methods)," Supplement to the Accounting Review (1972), pp. 407-437. 
R. E. Dukes, "Market Evaluation of Alternative Account ing Information Systems" 
(Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University). Nicholas J. Gonedes, "Efficient Capital 
Markets and External Account ing," Accounting Review (January 1972), pp. 11-21. 
L. L. Lookabill, "A Study of the Relationship Between Accounting Information and 
Market Valuation of Securit ies" (Unpublished dissertation, Stanford University). 
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choosing among accounting alternatives. For example, it is stated that 
"observations of the market reactions of recipients of accounting outputs 
should govern evaluations of the actual informational content of accounting 
numbers produced via a given set of procedures and the informational con-
tent of accounting numbers2 produced via an alternative set of accounting 
procedures." The underlying contention is that in the context of competitive 
and efficient markets, transactors in the aggregate will not react to accounting 
information3 unless the accounting numbers have informational content.4 
Not much harm is caused by the assertion that when accounting numbers 
are used (as manifested in movement of stock prices), they have informational 
content. This is descriptive of a definition of what constitutes informational 
content and of actual phenomena, i.e., movement of stock prices. When it is 
asserted, however, that market reactions should govern the evaluation of 
accounting alternatives, the underlying implication is that when accounting 
numbers are used (i.e., the market reacts to them) they are also useful in the 
sense of satisfying the objectives of accounting. The problem with this 
approach is that it uses a definition and the manifested results of a descrip-
tive process to make a normative judgment (that market reactions should 
govern the evaluation of accounting alternatives). 
The assertion that market reactions should govern the evaluation of 
accounting alternatives is primarily justified by acknowledging that—assum-
ing that individuals are rational and that markets are efficient (as defined and 
shown in the efficient market literature)—one cannot expect the market to 
react unless accounting information is useful. However, the kind of useful-
ness that should be inferred from (a) the proposition that individuals are 
rational and from (b) the findings that markets adjust efficiently and un-
biasedly to information, may not necessarily be the kind of usefulness that 
we might care to require from accounting information. 
Evaluation of Usefulness 
In Light of Accounting Objectives 
Certainly, the kind of usefulness that is desired can be derived only from 
the objectives of accounting. For example, if among the criteria or objectives 
2 Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 12. 
3 Reaction to accounting information is generally measured via movements in the 
stock price through which the aggregate behavior of market transactors is manifested. 
4 Informational content of accounting output is usually implicit ly defined as those 
attributes of the accounting output that trigger market reaction. For example, Ball & 
Brown argue, "If, as the evidence indicates, security prices do in fact adjust rapidly 
to new information as it becomes available, the changes in security prices will reflect 
the flow of information to the market. An observed revision of stock prices associated 
with the release of the income report would thus provide evidence that the information 
reflected in income numbers is useful." (Ball and Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of 
Accounting income Numbers," pp. 160-161.) 
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of accounting there is listed the efficiency in resource allocation and perhaps 
some criteria relative to the distribution of wealth,5 it may be discovered that 
the kind of usefulness inferred from market reactions does not necessarily 
satisfy these two objectives. In other words, the kind of market equilibrium 
consistent with presently available accounting information and the degree of 
efficiency of the market's reaction to this kind of information may not neces-
sarily be the desired equilibrium. (Note that equilibrium is a descriptive 
phenomenon and not in itself an indication that some normative criterion has 
been satisfied.) Thus, the manifestations of a present equilibrium which may 
be undesirable cannot be used as a normative criterion for choosing the 
accounting alternative which best satisfies an objective. The satisfaction of 
the specified objective may well require a different kind of market equilibrium 
which—if extant—would produce entirely different manifestations. 
To put things somewhat differently, imagine that there are two market 
equilibrium systems, A and B, and two distinct systems of accounting pro-
cedures resulting in sets of accounting signals X and Y, respectively. Then 
assume that X and Y are evaluated on the basis of the market's reactions. 
Suppose it turns out that under system A the market reacts to X but not to Y 
(thus indicating that X, and not Y, has informational content) while under 
system 3, the market reacts to Y but not to X (thus implying that Y, and not X, 
has informational content). Which is the better accounting system? Clearly, 
in this situation the market reaction is not a sufficient criterion. There is still 
open the question of which equilibrium system, A or B, better serves the 
objectives. This illustration could also be applied over time rather than across 
market systems. Presumably, a different market equilibrium system existed 
100 years ago and the accounting system undoubtedly was somewhat dif-
ferent from today's practice. How can the two systems be evaluated if the 
market reacted to both systems? How can a descriptive phenomenon be 
used to make normative judgments?6 
Exploration of the descriptive phenomenon is valuable in understanding 
the market mechanism and in generating hypotheses about the nature of 
decision-making in the marketplace. The descriptive phenomenon is also 
useful in testing the implications of hypotheses about how decisions are 
made in the marketplace. However, it cannot be the sole test of which 
5 While the means of achieving allocation of resources in the economy are subject 
to debate, probably none would question the desirability of efficient resource allocation 
as a goal. As to equity criteria relative to the distribution of wealth, they are clearly 
implicit as objectives. For example, Rules 10b-5, 10b-6 and Section 16 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the Court rulings in the Texas Gulf case relate to insider 
trading and the disclosure of information. 
6 Indeed, it may be argued that technological changes modify the nature of the 
equil ibr ium over time. The proposition of an accounting alternative whose test of 
usefulness is not derived from extant equil ibrium can be viewed as a technological 
change in itself. 
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accounting alternative better satisfies our goals and should therefore be 
preferred. The appropriate test should depend, among other things, on pre-
specified accounting objectives.7 
The Argument That Accounting Operates 
In a Competitive Context 
The contention that accounting alternatives should be evaluated on the 
basis of market reactions is partially defended on the grounds that the 
accounting process provides information only in a competitive context and 
that there are alternative sources of information that investors could use.8 The 
contention that accounting operates in a competitive context is based on (a) 
the assumption that accounting numbers include information that reflects 
economy-wide events and industry-wide events that can also be obtained 
from other indicators such as industrial production reports and national 
income reports, and (b) the evidence of the existence of anticipatory price 
movements that precede the announcement of accounting numbers.9 Thus, 
it is argued that if there were no other sources competing with accounting 
information, one would expect to observe rapid price movements when 
accounting data are disseminated. As a result, it is postulated that ". . . 
market transactors in the aggregate do not blindly accept and use account-
ing numbers only" and therefore "the market's reaction to accounting num-
bers (e.g., the anticipatory reactions noted above) provides reliable indication 
of accounting numbers' informational content."10 
There are several problems with these contentions. Alternative sources 
of information with respect to economy- and industry-wide events that affect 
the value of the firm may well exist, but the likelihood of alternative sources 
of information about the existence of a firm's specific events is minimal. It is 
indeed possible that the latter does exist since such events usually constitute 
transactions involving other entities which, potentially, could provide the in-
formation. However, the cost of reconstructing the firm's specific events from 
numerous and possibly scattered sources is probably prohibitive. As a result, 
such a reconstruction of events may not be undertaken by investors since 
7 A framework for the formulation of accounting objectives is discussed by the author 
in "A User Oriented Development of Accounting Information Requirements," pp. 80-
103, this volume. 
8 See, e.g., Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 14: 
" In particular it appears that the accounting process—qua supplier of information— 
does not possess strict monopoly power over the supply of information pertinent to the 
evaluation of a firm. Instead, it appears that the accounting process—qua supplier of 
information—funct ions within a competit ive context." 
9 For example, Ball and Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income 
Numbers." 
10 Gonedes, "Eff icient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 16. 
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the cost may exceed the perceived benefits.11 Thus, if some firm-specific 
information is not provided by the firm, even if it is available in the market it 
may not be used. This fact is consistent with an efficient market in which 
transaction costs are assumed to exist. 
Moreover, a market equilibrium in which transactors do not seek infor-
mation because of the high cost of search, even when they know that it exists, 
is consistent with the evidence collected about efficient markets. And when 
accounting information is provided about firms' specific events for which 
alternative sources of information are too costly to seek out, transactors are 
justified in relying on the accounting information. 
Thus, if it is found that transactors accept and use accounting numbers 
(this phenomenon has occasionally been referred to as functional fixation,12 
although the term has never been rigorously defined), this does not neces-
sarily imply that they do so blindly. Use of the accounting numbers by 
transactors may be explained by one or both of the following propositions: 
1. In equilibrium, investors rely on accounting information whenever the 
cost of seeking alternative sources about the same events exceeds the bene-
fits of searching. This is likely to be the case in particular with respect to 
firms' specific events.13 Thus investors' reliance on accounting information 
does not imply that they do so blindly, but rather that they make rational 
decisions about when to stop seeking information. 
2. The accounting system is a vehicle for management to communicate 
its expectations about the firm's cash flows, and it is likely that investors view 
accounting information as a surrogate for management expectations which 
they utilize since there are no alternative sources. 
A social organization that requires firms to report probably results from 
an implicit decision based on information economics. Delegation of the in-
formation provision function to the firm makes sense if the firm can produce 
the information at a lower cost than outsiders. This is consistent with the 
evidence that accounting information is anticipated through price move-
11 This is consistent with the phenomenon, for example, that in some developing 
countries the state enforces the disclosure of minimal accounting information (appar-
ently because individuals find it too costly to produce the information themselves). 
Turkey is a case in point. See Var Turgut, "The Turkish Uniform Accounting Plan," 
(Unpublished manuscript, University of Kansas). 
12 Yuji Ijiri, Robert K. Jaedicke, and Kenneth E. Knight, "The Effects of Accounting 
Alternatives on Management Decisions," Research in Accounting Measurement, edited 
by Robert K. Jaedicke, Yuji Ijiri, and Oswald Nielson (Evanston, III.: American Account-
ing Association, 1966). 
13 The cost to the firm of processing information about its specific events and trans-
actions is probably lower because of scale economies. While no evidence exists on 
this hypothesis, it is clearly empirically testable. It is also consistent with the observa-
tion that the SEC and other governmental agencies increasingly require more account-
ing information to be disseminated. To provide evidence against this hypothesis, it 
must be shown, for example, that anticipatory market reaction is caused solely through 
sources other than the firm and that the anticipatory reaction explains all reaction to 
accounting information (which has yet to be shown). 
40 
merits prior to the announcement date. There probably exist cheaper outside 
sources for information about economy-wide and industry-wide information 
that are tapped in advance of the announcement of accounting informa-
tion. Some firm-specific events could also be anticipated as a result of 
announcements by the firms' managements through releases issued by 
market newsletter services and through reports by the firm to the SEC, etc. 
These "leakages," however, all come from the firm itself and could well be 
viewed as part of its information or accounting system. In fact, it might be 
advisable to incorporate such announcements formally into the accounting 
system, since they would then be subject to audit and verification. 
In sum, the existing evidence on efficient markets may well be viewed 
as being consistent with the following statement: Market transactors, in the 
aggregate, accept and use accounting numbers as well as any additional 
information that they can obtain at reasonable search costs. Had accounting 
numbers not been provided, market reactions might have been different since 
the information contained in accounting numbers might then have been too 
costly to obtain elsewhere. Thus, market reactions alone do not provide a 
criterion for evaluating information alternatives. 
In particular, individuals' reliance on accounting numbers does not indi-
cate irrationality or psychological conditioning. Rather, it may reflect ration-
ality within the context of a competitive market in which information is costly 
and in which expectations about the value of different data are heterogeneous. 
Individual rationality is thus consistent both with the reliance on accounting 
data (without testing their informational content through seeking other 
sources), and with a competitive equilibrium that assumes costly information 
and heterogeneous expectations. And while the evidence from the efficient 
market research (both the weak and the semi-strong form) is consistent with 
that efficient market hypothesis which assumes costless information and 
homogeneous expectations, it is also consistent with an efficient market 
hypothesis that assumes costly information and heterogeneous expecta-
tions.14 
The Argument That Stock Prices Eventually 
Reflect "Inside Information" 
Finally, the argument is usually made that market reaction is a reliable 
indicator since it impounds any existing information, even that not made 
publicly available. It is contended that since there must be at least one 
person possessing the information who recognizes the inefficiencies that 
result from its nonpublic availability, he would—being rational—exploit this 
opportunity either by transacting directly in the market or by selling the in-
formation. Thus, the knowledgeable person (possessing the information) 
14 Stigler, for example, argues: "There is no imperfection in a market possessing 
incomplete knowledge if it would not be remunerative to acquire (produce) complete 
knowledge. Information costs are the costs of transportation from ignorance to omni-
science, and seldom can a trader afford to take the entire tr ip." (George J. Stigler, 
" Imperfect ions in the Capital Markets," Journal of Political Economy (June 1963), p. 
291, as quoted in Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External Account ing," p. 20). 
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will, through his own action, help to eliminate inefficiency in the market. 
However, while it is true that any new existing information is apt to be 
impounded eventually through an arbitrage mechanism, this mechanism may 
not be the most desirable process through which information should get 
impounded in market prices. This is particularly true from the standpoint of 
social optimum (considering both allocative and distributive criteria). The 
undesirability can result for several reasons: 
1. Assuming that inside information exists,15 there is uncertainty about 
the length of time needed for the arbitrage process to rectify the allocative 
inefficiency (resulting from nonpublic availability of the information). Since 
the time lapse is likely to be greater than it would be if such information were 
required to be immediately available to the public, the allocative inefficiency 
is apt to continue for a longer time period than if such a requirement were 
made. 
2. Insiders possessing information not available to the public or supe-
rior forecasting ability are likely to cause the information to be impounded 
in market prices with less efficiency than if they were to make the information 
immediately available to the public. This is likely to be the case for at 
least two reasons. First, they may not have the sufficient capital immediately 
available to carry out the volume of trading necessary to rectify the ineffi-
ciency. Second, they are not likely to have a comparative advantage in selling 
information or in offering portfolio management services. In comparison, 
if such information were required to be made immediately available through 
the accounting system, the process is likely to be more efficient, since there 
is a greater likelihood that individuals with sufficient capital and those who 
possess comparative advantage in selling information would be included 
among the recipients of the information. 
3. The likelihood of a single individual or a small knowledgeable 
group being able to interpret inside information properly is less than the 
likelihood of the same information being ably interpreted if it were available 
to many persons and many groups, i.e., if it were publicly available. In other 
words, the greater the number of participating rivals in the marketplace, the 
more efficient is the process of competitive equilibrium. 
4. Finally, the prospect of insiders becoming wealthier may not be 
palatable to those for whom criteria for desirable distribution of wealth are 
considered to be important. 
Existing Incentives to Communicate 
Desirable Information 
It is assumed in the efficient market literature,16 that the existence of 
super-analysts will eventually insure that actual market prices are, on the 
15 Some evidence on the existence of inside information is provided by Myron 
Scholes in "A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New Issues 
and Secondary Offerings" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1969). 
16 See, for example, Eugene F. Fama, "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," Journal 
of Business (January 1965), pp. 34-105. 
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basis of all available information, best estimates of intrinsic values. But 
notice that the identity, on the average, between security prices and the 
intrinsic value ultimately depends on the ability to consistently predict the 
appearance of new information and the subsequent prediction of its impact 
on intrinsic values. Suppose there is new information which is neither made 
available to sophisticated traders nor predictable on the basis of presently 
known information (possibly because it does not fit into the familiar pattern 
of information dependencies learned by the analyst). It is conceivable that, 
had this information been made available, the stock price would have been 
changed as a result of impounding the content of the new information. It 
could be argued that, since equilibrium is reached in the absence of this 
information and the relative wealth of the investors is preserved, it is not 
crucial that the new information be reflected in actual prices. However, in 
that event, resource allocation is sub-optimal. Thus, from the standpoint of 
stating accounting objectives, the relevant questions are: 
1. What are the likely sources that possess new information which may 
not be made immediately available publicly? 
2. Does the existing market system provide incentives for those sources 
to make the information available? 
A likely source of new information is the firm itself. The new information 
consists of prospective cash flows that result from the decisions and plans 
being made continuously within the firm.17 These plans and decisions are 
first known to the management; they are the endogenous factors—peculiar 
to the firm—responsible for the firm's unique rate of return. Because man-
agement is the first to know its plans, it is also the first to make a prediction 
of the cash flows that result from these decisions. Thus, by systematically 
and periodically communicating expectations of cash flows, management 
can provide valuable information that is not, at the present time, made avail-
able systematically. 
The second question can best be examined by considering the system 
of incentives offered by the market that may induce the provision of such 
information with and without disclosure laws. 
Incentives for Producing and Communicating 
Information in the Absence of Disclosure Laws 
This question was investigated directly by Fama and Laffer18 and in-
directly by Hirshleifer.19 In spite of the different approaches, the two dis-
cussions reach many of the same conclusions. Since Fama and Laffer's 
17 While management's expectations of these flows may be communicated publicly, 
they are not part of the systematic and periodic accounting reports and they are 
generally communicated in an ad hoc and sporadic fashion at the present time. 
18 Eugene F. Fama and Arthur B. Laffer, " Information and Capital Markets," Journal 
of Business (July 1971), pp. 289-298. 
19Jack Hirshleifer, "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive 
Activity," American Economic Review (September 1971), pp. 561-574. 
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discussion is, however, more germane to the role of information produced 
by the firm vis-a-vis other sources, it is used as a basis for discussion. Their 
main conclusions are briefly stated, and their underlying assumptions are 
examined. 
The Fama and Laffer Conclusions 
And Assumptions 
Fama and Laffer conclude that the production of information for trading 
purposes only20 is not consistent with Pareto optimality. The production and 
communication of this information is costly since it uses resources merely 
to redistribute wealth and not to generate it. Thus "investors as a whole 
would be better off (and the producer would be no worse off) if they could 
simply pay the monopolist in order to induce him not to produce informa-
tion "21 
Since high transaction costs are associated with such side payments, 
the authors predict that, in general, there will be some socially sub-optimal 
information output. Other conclusions of interest are as follows: 
1. In equilibrium there will be a single producer of a certain type of 
information about a firm, and when this producer is an independent outsider 
(vis-a-vis the firm) his profits will always be greater if he sells the information 
rather than use it for his own trading. 
2. Under competitive conditions of producing information, a producer 
can cover his costs only by selling to investors. 
3. As a rule, under monopolistic conditions information will be sold. 
4. When a firm produces information about itself, it produces less than 
an independent outsider, since the firm considers the effects of its informa-
tion production on the firm's shareholders. 
5. In the interests of its shareholders, the firm has strong incentives 
to have all the information produced at its discretion. 
2 0 That is, information that neither reduces risk, thus reducing the supply of a non-
desirable commodity, nor improves operating decisions of the f i rm—thus bringing 
about savings in resources through their improved allocation. The authors concentrate 
on " information, as yet unavailable to the market, about decisions already made" 
("Information and Capital Markets," p. 291) that affects investor trading profits as a 
result of private access to new information. This type of information parallels what 
Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," pp. 
563-564) describes as prior information about the true states of the world in a simplif ied 
world of pure exchange, in which all productive transformations among entities and 
commodit ies are ruled out and in which the endowments of individuals can be modified 
only by trading. This is the type of information that can affect only the wealth dis-
tribution and not the resource allocation. 
21 Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 294. While Fama and 
Laffer discuss the incentives to produce information under both monopolistic, com-
petitive and partially competitive environments, the thrust of the conclusion is not 
significantly affected by the economic environment assumed. In all environments, it 
is concluded that socially sub-optimal information will tend to be produced, and only 
the extent of sub-optimality and the identity of the producer may be affected. 
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In summary, Fama and Laffer conclude that, except in the case of 
monopoly or partial monopoly, and when the monopolistic producer is an 
independent outsider rather than the firm itself,22 the firm will tend to produce 
information about itself and prevent others from doing so. 
The Fama and Laffer assumptions of primary concern to our discussion 
are as follows: 
1. Firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets, and the 
capital market is perfect in the sense of zero transaction costs (costless 
access to publicly available information) and the existence of perfect sub-
stitutes for the firm's securities. 
2. Investors can trade in the market without identifying themselves as 
possessing new information. 
3. Investors have "homogeneous expectations" in that they agree on 
the implications of any given information set for the equilibrium prices of 
securities. 
4. A seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee 
against resale of the information. 
Moreover, it is assumed that any potential producer of information 
about a firm knows the probability distribution of market value changes 
associated with different levels of information expenditures, and that— 
should these distributions have a zero mean—this fact is costless information. 
As a result, market prices impound it, and the consequence of going from 
zero to some positive level of expenditure is a probability distribution of 
market value that has a zero mean. 
Implications for Accounting 
To examine the implications of the conclusions for the need to specify 
accounting alternatives, assume first that the firm is the sole producer of 
information. If the firm is a monopolistic producer, it will benefit its share-
holders by enabling them to sell their stock in the case of negative fore-
knowledge information. Positive information would eventually come to light 
anyway and will not affect the expected gain to the firm's shareholders. But 
in the case of discovery information23 the firm will release positive information 
and either suppress negative information or give shareholders the oppor-
22 Which is an unlikely situation when the type of information produced is one 
that relates to a firm's specific events (see discussion below). Moreover, Fama and 
Laffer state that " the firm is not limited to direct competit ion with independent 
producers for sales to outsiders, since the cost to an outsider of producing informa-
tion about a firm is likely to be somewhat in the firm's control." ("Information and 
Capital Markets," p. 298.) 
23 The dichotomy between foreknowledge and discovery information was first 
made by Hirshleifer ("Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive 
Activity"). Foreknowledge consists of events that will become known whether or not 
information about them is generated. Discovery involves things that would not become 
known without information production. 
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tunity to sell before the information reaches the market.24 
When information generation is competitive, the firm will prevent entry 
by independent producers, give its information output to its shareholders, 
and recover its costs entirely from sales to outsiders. In this case, since the 
information will be available both to the firm's shareholders and to outsiders, 
no investors will have expected trading gains. In the case of partial monopoly, 
the firm will act like a monopoly with respect to incremental information that 
the firm produces for which the marginal cost is below that of the next 
cheapest producer. 
Thus, except for the case of competitive generation of information25 
there are likely to be trading gains or losses, i.e., redistribution of wealth. 
In the absence of a requirement with respect to immediate dissemination of 
information generated or known to the firm, and given all the Fama and Laffer 
assumptions,26 there are incentives that induce firms and outsiders either 
to sell information or to trade on its basis—thus causing redistribution of 
wealth. This shift of wealth may violate social distributive criteria of welfare 
aside from waste of resources. Thus, a requirement that information known 
to the firm must be disseminated can help in preventing shifts of wealth that 
could be socially undesirable even when the information produced is 
assumed to have no allocative effects. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that production of information which 
has allocative effects27 may be consistent with Pareto optimality in the sense 
that the benefits resulting from production decisions based on the information 
generated may well exceed the costs of producing the information. Indeed, 
given the Fama and Laffer assumptions, both the firm and outside inde-
pendent producers would have the incentive to generate the information 
and either act upon it or sell it.28 
It now becomes important to carefully examine the Fama and Laffer 
assumptions to determine whether, indeed, there is enough incentive to 
generate socially beneficial information that has allocative effects. Indeed, 
it seems unlikely that any information would have only a distributive effect 
and would not improve production decisions or the consumption-investment 
opportunities of individuals. For example, positive information (whether 
2 4 Fama and Laffer, "Information and Capital Markets," p. 294. Notice that in the 
case of discovery information, negative information may be suppressed. In a case 
where discovery information has allocative effects (in that it leads to improved oper-
ating decisions), on the other hand, it probably would not be disseminated, thus 
causing sub-optimali ty even under the strict assumptions made by Fama and Laffer. 
25 As indicated, this is unlikely with respect to the f irm-specif ic information since 
the firm has first access to the transactions giving rise to such information. 
26 " Information and Capital Markets." 
2 7 Notice that Fama and Laffer postulated that discovery information may well be 
of the type that can improve production, i.e., have allocative effects. 
28 Except in the case of negative discovery information which, once generated, 
may be suppressed by the firm. 
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foreknowledge or discovery) released by the firm will bring about a positive 
revision in the prices of securities which in turn would reduce the cost of 
capital-raising. This, in itself, is bound to have an effect on resource alloca-
tion decisions within the firm. 
The assumption that the capital market is perfect and that producing 
firms are perfectly competitive in their product markets is needed so that 
information about a specific firm will not affect the consumption-investment 
opportunities of individuals except through its effects on their wealth. This 
is analogous to Hirshleifer's assumption of pure exchange29 in which only 
the endowment vector of individuals, rather than production, is affected by 
the information generated. But information about a product or an industry 
is likely to affect consumption-investment opportunities through its implica-
tions for changes in relative prices. Thus, in the case of nonperfectly com-
petitive product markets or a nonperfect capital market or in the case where 
information is generated about an industry rather than about a single firm, 
the information generation will probably affect consumption-investment op-
portunities of investors, and thus affect the reallocation of resources and not 
merely the distribution of wealth.30 
Another set of assumptions that is not likely to hold is (a) that investors 
can trade without indicating that they possess new information and (b) that 
the seller of new information insists that the purchaser guarantee against 
resale of the information. The first assumption (nonidentifiability of a pos-
sessor of new information) insures that returns from exclusive access to 
information can be maximized. Through the second assumption other poten-
tial purchasers can be guaranteed exclusive access to the information sold. 
To the extent that either of these assumptions does not hold, which is the 
likely case, the incentive to generate and to communicate new information is 
significantly lessened. It is usually difficult to observe the selling of informa-
tion about a firm, especially accounting information. Accounting information 
is provided at zero price. This is probably so because the transaction costs 
of guaranteeing exclusive access to the information and of maintaining the 
unidentifiability of the possessor of new information are very high.31 
Even if information were sold at a positive price, the ability of the 
resulting price to provide an appropriate signal and incentive for the genera-
29 "Private and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity." 
30 These are probably the situations that Hirshleifer considers as " the more realistic 
regime in which production and exchange both take place." (Hirshleifer, "Private 
and Social Value of Information and the Inventive Activity," p. 566.) 
31 While information in the nature of "consul t ing advice" is sold by consult ing and 
management-services firms, the costs of policing the right and the exclusive access 
of the purchaser to the information are much smaller than those associated with 
guaranteeing access to information in the nature of " fac ts" about a firm. This is 
particularly true if we allow for heterogeneous expectations governing at the market 
place so that there is disagreement about the implications of facts. The interpretive 
processing by "advisors" can be viewed like any other commodity that commands 
a non-zero price in the market. 
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tion of information would be very limited. This is so because the ability to 
enforce the right to exclusive access to the information purchased determines, 
to a significant extent, the value of that information and its price. The ability 
of such enforcement is likely to be very limited in the case of information 
about a firm (including accounting information), and thus the private benefit 
for the seller is apt to be significantly below the social benefit.32 
The observance of zero prices for information about a firm (primarily 
accounting information) and the regulation of the amount and nature of 
information to be included in reports issued by the firm about itself are 
consistent with the assumption that the costs of policing information are ex-
cessively high. In other words, the reason that accounting information is 
presently regulated is probably because the property policing costs are too 
high to allow the market to generate accurate information on the social 
benefits of accounting information. In this situation, the SEC's, or preferably 
the profession's, determination of the objectives and nature of desirable 
accounting information may be the most practical way of coping with the 
nonfeasibility of guaranteeing exclusive access to information about the firm, 
just as government non-price rationing may be the most practical way of 
coping with high exchange costs. It should be noted, however, that the SEC's 
or the profession's rationing of information about the firm is costly and only 
second best to a market in which exchange and enforcement costs were low. 
Regulation, essentially a political process, would result in less efficiency 
than reliance on a market with low transaction costs. But, in the absence of 
the latter, regulation may be the only efficient way of ascertaining the social 
value of information about a firm unless the cost of regulation per se exceeds 
the benefits from rationing, in which case regulation should be eliminated.33 
Finally, the assumption of homogeneous expectations makes possible 
the proposition that there can be general agreement on the probability dis-
tributions of market value changes associated with different information 
expenditures and, if these have non-zero means, market prices will adjust 
unbiasedly. Once we allow for heterogeneous expectations, this will not 
hold and the likelihood that incentives for generating information would exist 
will not be assessable. 
If the above assumptions do not hold there may not be incentives in 
the market for generating information nor for overproducing information. In 
this case, and when the information has allocative effects (i.e., when informa-
tion affects resource allocation for productive purposes), the systems of 
incentives presently provided in the market may not induce the generation 
and communication of socially desirable information. 
32 For a lucid discussion of issues related to the impact of enforceability of rights 
to property on prices, see Harold Demsetz, "The Exchange and Enforcement of Prop-
erty Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, VII (October 1964), pp. 11-26. 
33 This " t ru is t ic" statement merely indicates the desirability of an extensive cost / 
benefit study of accounting information regulation. Such a study itself is not costless. 
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Effects of Disclosure Rules 
We now examine the possible effects of disclosure laws and regulation 
of information on the incentive for producing information about firms. If 
information that could potentially be produced by a firm has only distributive 
effects (e.g., for trading purposes), the present disclosure laws may lead to a 
social optimum.34 If the firm is a monopolistic producer of information it will 
generally lose its incentive to produce the information, since under the dis-
closure regulations it is prohibited from discriminating in favor of its share-
holders or from selling the information. This is also the case when the firm 
is able to produce the same information that an outside producer can gen-
erate at a lower cost. But as Fama and Laffer comment,35 there may be 
situations in which the disclosure laws can lead to inefficiencies in the sense 
that an outsider produces information that the firm could produce more 
cheaply were it not for the disclosure law that destroys the firm's incentive 
to produce. A more detailed analysis of the effect of the particular disclosure 
law in existence may help to clarify these points. For this purpose it will be 
assumed that the information discussed has potential allocative effects. 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, profits made within six 
months by a firm's officers through trading in the firm's stock inures to the 
firm [Section 78p(b) of the 15th U.S. Code], Moreover, Rule 10b-5 (of Title 240 
of the Code of Federal Regulations) prohibits the use of manipulative and 
deceptive devices, which are broadly construed to include making "any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security." Rule 10b-6 of the same regulation prohibits trading 
in securities by parties interested in their distribution. 
Under these rules a firm's officer, who is either in the possession of 
information or of the means to produce information which is either not likely to 
be revealed by an alternative source outside the firm within a period of six 
months36 or whose effect on price is expected to persist beyond six months, 
would have an economic incentive to maximize his gains from the infor-
mation by either trading in the stock himself or by selling the information 
to potential traders. (Notice that the law does not affect profits made through 
trading within a period that exceeds six months.) This does not mean that 
such an attempt to capitalize on information is costless. The attempt may be 
3 4 See Fama and Laffer, " Information and Capital Markets," p. 298. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The information could not likely be revealed by an outside source either if the 
insider has monopolist ic access to it (as a result of his position or decision-making 
function within the firm) or because the insider can produce the information more 
cheaply, thus enabling him to deter the production by outsiders. Notice that much of 
the relevant information possessed by firm insiders is an already manufactured by-
product of decision-making within the firm (e.g., cash flow forecasts necessary to make 
investment or divestment decisions), and the marginal costs of producing this informa-
tion for the firm insider (or decision-maker) is zero. 
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strictly illegal under Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6, and the expected consequences 
of illegal action must be perceived as part of the cost of trading or of other-
wise selling the information by the insider. In addition to this cost, there is 
the risk of the insider being held liable for misleading the firm's stockholders, 
thus jeopardizing his position in the firm. 
At any rate, the incentive for acting on inside information that is likely 
to be profitable within a period exceeding six months is greater than the 
incentive to act upon the information whose usefulness is limited to a period 
of six months, since in the latter case the profits—by law—would inure to the 
firm. To the extent that the insider acts upon it, the information will eventually 
be impounded in market prices37 thus securing allocative efficiency. Such 
trading, however, would violate the distributive goals implied in the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
When the profits from using information are expected to be made if 
trading is completed within a period of six months, firm insiders would have 
no economic incentive to trade in the firm's stock, since the profit from 
trading will inure to the firm. An insider can, of course, sell the information 
to outsiders (not including the firm's shareholders since a major shareholder 
of the firm is also considered as an insider by the law), although the transac-
tion costs of selling such information to outsiders are apt to be high both 
economically and legally (due to Rules 10b-5 and 10b-6). To the extent 
that insiders would sell such information in spite of the economic and legal 
costs, the information will be impounded in prices, although in the process 
some resources will be wasted through higher costs (as well as through 
increased risk to the sellers). To the extent that insiders would be deterred 
from selling information in this case, there may still be an incentive to gen-
erate the information (if it is not already known) and to make it available. 
In the absence of a direct economic incentive for the insider either to trade 
or sell the information, it would be to his benefit to make it available to the 
firm's shareholders so as to enable them to maximize their wealth and thus 
indirectly reinforce the insider. 
But a distinction must be made between positive information (i.e., 
information which if known will push stock prices up) and negative informa-
tion (information which if known will bring prices down). If the information 
is positive, it benefits the shareholders if the information is made publicly avail-
able immediately since the market value of their holdings38 will be increased. 
In fact, firms' officers do seem to make positive information available imme-
diately through press releases, analysts' conferences, and speeches. Such 
37 Subject to the inefficiencies that may result from communicat ing the information 
through insiders' actions for profit maximizing purposes versus immediately making 
the information available publicly, as discussed earlier. 
38 In the case of foreknowledge, the only benefits of immediately making available 
positive information from the point of view of shareholders is temporal, i.e., the price 
increase occurs immediately rather than later in time. In the case of discovery infor-
mation, however, the benefits consist of the total increase in wealth as a result of 
prices going up, since if information is not generated and communicated, it will not 
be known. 
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releases tend to be timed shortly before new issues or secondary issues of 
securities are offered even though this practice is illegal. This is understand-
able since the impact on prices of new information tends to reduce the firm's 
cost of raising capital. From the point of view of social optimal allocation, the 
public may be able to make more informed allocation decisions if specific 
information about a firm is periodically and systematically released so that it 
can be compared with information about other firms released at about the 
same time. The social benefit of such presentation which enables this com-
parison across firms may well exceed the private benefits perceived to inure 
to the firm as a result of such periodic reports. Thus, the firm may not have 
an incentive to communicate its information in such a manner, although such 
periodic and systematic communication—in addition to facilitating the com-
parison across firms—could enable potential investors to monitor and audit 
the information and thus assess its reliability. 
In the case of negative information, the firm will have no economic 
incentive to make the information public.39 It is again useful to make the 
distinction, however, between foreknowledge and discovery information. In 
the case of foreknowledge, since the information will become known later 
to the public, the firm will have an incentive to generate the information and 
make it known to its shareholders so that they can avoid capital losses by 
selling their stock. Because of the existence of the disclosure law, however, 
such trading will not enable shareholders to avoid losses. Since positive 
knowledge will only produce temporal benefits, the incentive to the firm for 
generating and communicating foreknowledge would be substantially reduced 
in cases where a disclosure law does not exist. Positive knowledge, being 
foreknowledge, will become known and inure to the benefit of shareholders 
anyway.40 When negative information is already generated as a by-product 
at zero marginal cost (as in the case of forecasts necessary to make deci-
sions which have to be made anyhow), such negative information will neither 
be acted upon by shareholders (in view of the law) nor publicly revealed 
(assuming that the firm will run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5). 
In the case of discovery information, the incentive for the firm to produce 
the information will be provided only through the positive information, since 
negative information will be suppressed (assuming again that the firm is 
willing to run the risk associated with Rule 10b-5). Positive information will 
be immediately made available so as to increase shareholders' wealth as 
soon as possible. Thus, the disclosure law is likely to exert only a small 
impact on inhibiting the production of discovery information.41 
39 Except for the risk associated with not disclosing known negative information 
due to Rule 10b-5 of Title 240, as explained above. 
4 0 But the identity of the benefitting shareholders may change between the point of 
time at which the foreknowledge would otherwise have been generated and the point 
of time at which it becomes publicly known. In that case, the temporal benefits re-
ferred to above and foregone as a result of late generation of the information would 
include wealth transfer from potential to existing shareholders. 
41 This slightly inhibiting effect results from whatever impact Rule 10b-5 will have 
on the l ikelihood that the firm will suppress negative information. 
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However if, as is likely, most of the insider information is foreknowledge 
(being results of decisions and actions already taken by a firm), it is highly 
likely that the net effect of the disclosure law will be to inhibit the processing 
and communication of insider information. To the extent that inside informa-
tion has potentially beneficial allocative effects, the net effect of the disclosure 
law would be harmful since it will not reveal information that improves the 
allocation of resources. Hence, the consideration of requiring, through regu-
lation or through specification of objectives, that inside information be 
periodically and systematically processed and communicated may well be 
worthwhile. 
Conclusions 
Considering the existing theory and evidence related to efficient markets, 
the choice among accounting alternatives cannot be determined solely 
through the examination of market price reactions to accounting information. 
Explicit formulation of accounting objectives is needed. 
Market incentives, even in the absence of present disclosure laws, may 
not be sufficient to insure the production and communication of economically 
useful information. The existing disclosure laws aggravate the problem and 
seem to reduce the incentive to produce and disseminate useful information. 
To the extent that information has potential allocative effects outside the 
firm, the existence of a disclosure law may be suboptimal because the firm 
would lack the incentive to produce information that could make resource 
allocation more efficient. Thus, present disclosure laws that prohibit the 
firm from selling information or from benefitting its shareholders vis-a-vis 
others can destroy the incentive to produce economically useful information. 
Presumably, the intent of present disclosure laws is primarily to prevent 
undesirable redistribution of wealth that could result from monopolistic access 
to information. In the process, however, the overall magnitude of wealth 
may be lessened as a result of impeding the production of desirable signals 
for resource allocation. If the wealth-distribution goal implied in the dis-
closure law is taken for granted, regulation of what information is to be pro-
duced and disclosed by a firm is needed to insure that information useful for 
allocation decisions is produced by a firm. 
In other words, if present disclosure laws must continue to exist to 
satisfy wealth distribution and other goals, additional regulation of account-
ing information by the private and/or governmental sectors seems warranted 
to nullify the adverse effect that the present laws may have on the production 
and communication of economically useful accounting information. More-
over, even if present laws are abrogated, market forces still do not seem to 
provide sufficient incentives for the production of useful information, thus 
implying that regulation appears necessary. The formulation of accounting 
objectives, preferably by the accounting profession and other directly involved 
parties, is a preliminary and a necessary step for such regulation. 
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